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Initially Korean ODA was focused in geographically proximity areas within Asian 
region, however, in the recent past, the focus is gradually shifting to Africa. Whether it 
is catching up with her Asian neighbours Japan and China or it is a genuine desire to 
contribute and uplift African countries out of poverty is not clear. Korea provides an 
interesting  example of a country that understands foreign aid in its dual form (as a 
recipient and a donor). Developing countries wish to emulate albeit with modifications 
the Korean economic prosperity experience. The main objective of this study is to find 
out why is Korea increasing bilateral aid to Africa?, a comparative case study between 
Kenya and Tanzania was used to decipher. Ricourian model was used to carry out 
comparative three levels of analysis, economic, political and social factor which could 
influence increase in aid allocation to Tanzania and not Kenya. The model was used 
because it  affords the opportunity to carry out level of  analysis of the factors in play. 
 
ii  
In this study we found that even though social, political and economic factors influence 
aid increase in Tanzania, economic factors carry more weight than the other two 
factors. From these results we can infer that, the increase in Korean bilateral aid to 
Africa is motivated by economic interests. The findings of the study supports the 
hypothesis that economic reasons is the main motivation for increase of Korea bilateral 
aid to Africa. 
 
Keywords: Bilateral aid, Deciphering, Kenya, Tanzania, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), Economic, Political, Motivation. 
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The African Economic Outlook for 2016 prepared by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that, foreign bilateral aid in form of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA)  remains a major  source of finance to fund 
public expenditure in Africa. In 2015, ODA (grants and concessional loans)  stood at  
USD 56 billion and  an increase of  4.1 per cent is expected  in 20161. The Republic of 
Korea ( for purpose of this study will be referred as Korea) endevours to be part of the 
above statistics in its bid to assert herself as an emerging player in ODA provision in 
Africa. Initially Korean ODA was focused in geographically proximity areas within 
Asian region, however, in the recent past, the focus is gradually shifting to Africa. 
Whether it is catching up with its Asian neighbours Japan and China or it is a genuine 
desire to contribute and uplift African countries out of poverty is not clear.  
 
Traditionally ODA was aimed at helping developing countries address poverty 
challenges and induce or accelerate economic growth, however, the reality is that,  
developed nations use foreign aid as a tool to pursue  their national interests. Balancing 
these two conflicting motivations is difficult to most donors. Korea provides an 
interesting  example of a country that understands foreign aid in its dual form (as a 
                                                        
1 AfDB/OECD/UNDP (2016), “External financial flows and tax revenues for Africa”, in 




recipient and a donor). For example, before and during the cold war, Korea benefitted 
from huge amounts of  foreign aid as one of the world’s poor country. As Yoon and 
Moon  ( 2014:279) argues that one of the outstanding factors which contributed to the 
rapid economic development of Korea was ODA received amounting to US$ 12 billion 
from 1945 to 1990. Today, Korea is the second OECD/ Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), Asian donor after Japan recognized among the traditional Western 
donor nations. According to Moon Hwy-Chang (2016:89)  “ Korea’s  GDP per capita 
in 1961 was less than $100. In the same period, Ghana’s was $190. In 2014, Korea’s 
GDP per capita was $27,970 while Ghana’s $1,443” The above statistics demonstrates 
how Korea managed to transit from an LDC  to a developed country. Whereas we can 
not attribute the rapid economic growth solely on foreign aid received, we can safely 
argue that foreign aid was instrumental  in Korean development. Korea may not have 
been able to achieve the economic development it is enjoying currently, Korea,  is a 
unique success story in modern development discourse. 
 
Korea’s initial bilateral aid was in  form of technical training in 1970s and 80s to 
developing countries (Park and Lee, 2015:181). In 1989, Korea extended to developing 
countries its first concessional loan. Subsequently, in 1991, Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA), a distinct agency charged with implementing grant 
projects was established. In January 2010, Korea joined OECD/ DAC, an association 
of aid donor governments, as the twenty fourth (24) member country. Since becoming 
a donor, Korea has increased its focus in Africa. In 2010, South Korea announced 
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plans to double her Official Development Assistance (ODA) to US$ 1.09 billion in the 
next five years to Africa. Korea joined OECD/ DAC, raising her profile and showing 
commitment to adhere to humanitarian aid goals. Korea lobbied other G-20 Members 
to consider long-term development issues in their engagement with developing 
countries leading to acceptance of Seoul Development consensus  in November 2010. 
The Seoul Development Consensus  required member countries to focus on issues of 
realizing the Millennium Development Goals, sustainable infrastructure and focusing 
on agricultural production in their future engagements. 
 
Korea organized  Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4)  in 2011, the 
forum adopted  Busan Declaration, which agreed on shared principles to development 
cooperation such as emphasis on owneship of development priorities by recipient 
countries. It is highly appreciated that developing partners wants to assist developing 
countries to address poverty challenges, however, such partnership efforts can only 
bear fruits if they are geared towards uniqueness of each country  needs and  situation. 
The next principle is to focus on results, the fundamental goal of giving aid is to help 
developing countries eradicate poverty, reduce inequality and achieve sustainable 
development. Therefore, over the years the focus on results by donors was overlooked, 
the Busan Declaration  required donor countries to devote their energies  to a course 
that will yield to long term emancipation of the poor and brigde the  inequality gap,  
caring for environment, and ensuring development priorities set out by developing 
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countries are aligned with donors 2 . Other principles agreed incude inclusive 
development partnerships, transparency and accountability of  donor as well as 
recipient countries. The success of the HLF-4 is a testimony of Korea’s leadership in 
international aid mobilization.  
 
Many countries in Africa view Korea as a country which managed to transform herself 
from rags to riches  in a half a century. Developing countries wish to emulate albeit 
with modifications the Korean economic prosperity experience. According to Korea 
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) Annual Report for 2014, “Africa is a 
home to 33 of the world’s 48 poorest countries”(KOICA 2014:46). The World Bank 
report (2014), indicates that in Africa there is no developed economy with high 
income, a few countries are categorised as upper-middle income. Inspite of their needs 
for ODA, Korean bilateral aid has varied signifficantly across recipient countries. 
Some African countries received millions of dollars, for example in 2014, Tanzania 
received US $ 79.8 million, Mozambique US $ 56.5 million, Ethiopia US $ 42.9 
Million, while others received none such as Namibia, Congo and Mauritius. Therefore, 
what could be the explanation for this disparity? Korea pride her self to have managed 
to transit from an LDC to a member of OECD/DAC. How, then can an emerging donor 
approaches her new role? Conventional wisdom demands that as a former LDC, Korea 
would consider humanitarian approach rather that self-interest driven. Official 
                                                        
2 Busan Partnership For Effective Development Co-Operation Fourth High Level Forum On 
Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic Of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011: P.3 
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announcements by donor countries or documents such as annual reports seldom 
unearth their genuine motivations for providing assistance to developing countries. It is 
extremely difficult to decipher the motivation, further, the aid rhetoric may not 
correspond to the actual pratice. A possible alternative is to carry out a comparative 
study between African countries receiving Korean bilateral aid to ascertain whether the 
relationship between characteristics of a recipient countries and aid volume reveal any 
clue about Korea’s motivation for providing aid. In this study we endevour to compare 
Korean bilateral aid between Kenya and Tanzania. 
 
Historical background of Korea-Africa relations 
Before and during the cold war 
Korea’s relations with Africa can be traced since the Korean War when one African 
country, Ethiopia provided 1,200 troops which fought in support of the Republic of 
Korea3. In the 1960’s, the two divided Koreas were eager to gain political legitimacy 
and diplomatic recognition from independent African countries. North Korea’s 
cooperation with some African countries on military field and anti-colonization 
propaganda helped to galvanise diplomatic superiority over South Korea. Inter-Korean 
tension was largely responsible for Seoul’s diplomatic embrace of Africa, “throughout 
the cold war, Sub-Saharan Africa functioned as an ideological chessboard for Seoul 
and Pyongyang” (Darracq and Neville, 2014:8). The ‘Korean question’ was a hot issue 
                                                        
3 Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, Republic of Korea, (2012), ‘The eternal Partnership: 
Ethiopia and Korea, P.59 
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at the UN annually, Seoul was concerned that Pyongyang was gaining ground. For 
example in 1970’s, North Korea had opened resident missions in 23 African countries 
while South Korea had only 10 ( Kim, 2013).  
 
During 1960’s and early 70s, “South Korea implemented a one-Korea policy, which 
prohibited African countries from dual simultaneous diplomatic relations”. (Yoon and 
Moon, 2014:282). In 1973, President Park Chung-hee, the father of the current Korean 
President, made a paradigm shift, by abandoning the Hallstein ‘ideological’ Doctrine, 
which refused to establish diplomatic relations with countries which recognised North 
Korea ( Kim, 2013:53). The objective was to gain support from African countries on 
UN membership and unification (Lee, 2011:144). In 1970s, African states were not 
only the biggest voting block at the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) but 
also were instrumental in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Democratic People’s of 
Korea (DPRK) entry to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1976 further 
strengthened its diplomatic advantage over Korea. It maintained a closer diplomatic 
relations with Africa signifying the importance Pyongyang attaches to the continent in 
her ‘anti-Seoul Campaign’. These development motivated Seoul’s initial interest to 
counter the growing influence of its foe. In early 1980s, President Chun Doo-hwan 
adopted South-South diplomacy. He focused his attention to Africa by inviting two 
heads of states to Korea, one from Liberia and the other from former Zaire 
(Democratic Republic of Congo). In order to reciprocate and to show commitment in 
promoting South-South cooperation, President Chun was the first to make maiden 
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official visit to the continent. He visited Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal and Kenya. 
 
President Roh Tae-woo adopted a new strategy, referred to as ‘Nordpolitik’, which 
emphasised on promotion of commercial relations while minimizing military 
confrontations with DPRK4. Seoul’s goal was to solicit official recognition from Africa 
to support its application of membership to the UN. It is at this period; late 1980s that 
Korea Official Development Assistance (ODA) was initiated to “promote greater trade 
and investment with developing nations”5 This strategy was successful as the two 
Koreas were admitted to the United Nations together in September 1991. 
 
After the cold war to present 
Seoul’s engagement with Africa went to a cold after cold war and gaining UN 
Membership, it pursued “northern diplomacy”6 which paid less attention to Africa. It 
shifted focus to Eastern Europe by normalising diplomatic relations with former Soviet 
Union countries and also with China. During this period the number of resident Korean 
diplomatic presences in Africa reduced from 18 to 137.  
 
The limited diplomacy and change of policy towards Africa began at the turn of                                                         
4 Robet Bedeski, the transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth 
Republic under Roo Tae Woo, 1987-1992 (London: Routledge, 1994). 
5 U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (2011), ‘Korea’s ODA to Africa: Strategic or humanitarian? ’, 
US-Korea 2010 Yearbook. 
6  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 
www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/countries/middleeast/local/index.jsp?menu=m_30_50_20, accessed on 
11/07/2016. 
7 www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/main/index.jsp#gosite accessed on 10/07/2016 
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millennium. The administrations of President Roh Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung Bak are 
credited for playing a key role in focusing on Africa on Korea’s foreign policy agenda. 
Seoul declared 2006 “the year of friendship with Africa” (MOFAT 2007:111). Several 
Korea-Africa initiatives were set in motion, President Roh made an official visit to 
Africa, the first one in 24 years. It is during the visit that the Korean President 
announced the establishment of the Korean Initiative for African Development (KIAD), 
which pledged to triple the amount of ODA to Africa by the year 2008. It is also during 
the presidential tour that a Korea-Africa relation was institutionalized by setting forum 
such as; 
 
1. The Korea-Africa Forum (KAF), this is a Ministerial meeting bringing 
together Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Korea and African countries to discuss 
issues of common interest. It was a joint initiative between the African Union 
and Korea Foreign Ministry. 
2. The Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC), it was aimed at 
promoting trade and economic cooperation. It was jointly organized by Korea 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the African Development Bank and the 
Korean Exim Bank. 
3. The Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation Forum (KOAFIC), its objective was to 
encourage bilateral industrial cooperation. It was overseen by Korean Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy. 
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The first KAF was held in Seoul in November 2006, delegations from 31 African states 
attended. The initial meeting established a foundation for framework of friendship, 
partnership and cooperation between African countries and Korea. At the inaugural 
conference, Korea announced it will triple ODA for African countries to US $ 100 
million a year by 2008 (Hwang, 2014:261). The second conference took place in Seoul 
in December 2009; it was co-sponsored by Korea and the African Union.  During the 
forum Korea pledged to increase by  two folds her ODA to Africa in the next five years, 
invite 5,000 trainees to Korea and dispatching 1,000 Korean Volunteers to 
Africa”( Yoon and Moon, 2014:283). The third conference was held in Seoul in 2012, 
35 African countries participated. The conference came up with an Action Plan (2013-
2015) where three main agendas were identified to enhance partnership; development 
cooperation, trade and investment, and peace and security. With regard to development 
cooperation, the conference emphasised human resource development and agricultural 
development. Partnerships such as Korea-African Food and Agriculture Cooperation 
Initiative (KAFACI) and the Korea Project on International Agriculture (KOPIA) were 
established. 
 
Since the establishment KIAD the relations between Korea and Africa has increased 
ODA from 7.5% in 2005 to 21.7% in 2014, showing an increase of 14.2% in a period 
of ten years. According to KOICA annual report for 2014, the bilateral aid to Africa 
10  
stood at 125,780 million Korean won8.   
 
High level visits were initiated to solidify the relationship, in July 2011; President Lee 
Myung-bak made an official visit to South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Ethiopia. In late May and early June 2016, President Park Geun-hye visited 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya where she launched the Korea Aid Program to help 
achieve sustainable development goals (Yonhap news Agency, Seoul: 28 May, 2016). 
Korea ODA to Africa in figure 
Figure 1: Korea net ODA disbursement to Africa 2003-20149 
 
Source: OECD (2016). 
ODA is the amount of resources flowing from one government to another government 
signifying donor and recipient relationship. Korea’s ODA has increased sharply since                                                         
8 Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), 2014 annual report. 
9 OECD (2016), Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2016: 
Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators, OECD 
Publishing, Paris 
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2006 as illustrated in figure 1 above. Between 2003 and 2006, ODA increased from 19 
million USD to 47.8 million USD signifying a double increase. From 2007 to 2014, 
ODA increased from 70.2 million USD to 332.7 million USD showing quadruple 
increase. According to KOICA annual report for 2014, Africa accounted for 21.7% 
Korean total aid disbursement. 
Figure 2: Korea net ODA disbursement to all regions 2005-2014 
 
Source: OECD (2016). 
Figure 2, shows that during the period under review, Korea’s net ODA disbursement is 
concentrated in the Asian region. Africa is the second major recipient and fastest 
growing followed by distant third America then Europe and Oceania. The focus clearly 
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Figure 3. Korea Africa trade trends (2003-2014) 
 
Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA) 
Figure 3 above shows that exports from Korea to Africa has increased tremendously 
from USD 389 million in 2003 to USD 1.6 Billion in 2014, Korean imports from 
Africa has also increased from USD 207 million in 2003 to USD 876 million in 2014. 
The balance of trade between Korea and Africa is widening in favour of Korea. In 2014 
the balance of trade stood at USD 771 million.  
 
1.1 Rationale of the Study 
Korean bilateral aid to Africa has seen a sharp increase in the recent past, this increase 
in aid has been concentrated to a few countries referred to as priority countries ranging 
from 5 to 10 out of the 55 countries in Africa. The priority list has been changing over 
time, droping some countries while adding others. This study is a comparative study on 
Korean bilateral aid between Kenya and Tanzania. It aims  to compare between Kenya 
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Kenya and Tanzania as a basis of comparative study is informed by their respective 
unique characteristics. Both are East African countries bordering each other, they were 
both colonized by British, they are Members of East African Community and both 
were categorized as least developing countries until 2014  when Kenya moved to low 
middle income country. Kenya’s economy is bigger than Tanzania, however, Tanzania 
is a mineral rich country having discovered huge deposits of natural gas. In terms of 
Korean bilateral aid, Tanzania is one of the priority countries for several years while 
Kenya has been on and off the list as shown in the table 1 below.  
Table1.KOICA five priority African countries from 2005-201410 
N
o. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Ghan
a 






































































5 Tanza Alger Alger Tunis Ethio Egypt Rwan Moro Tunis Ghan
                                                        
10 KOICA Annual Report for, 2005-2014. 
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nia ia ia ia pia da cco ia a 
 
Source: KOICA annual report (2005-2014). 
 
As shown above in table1, Tanzania  features in 9 years out of 10 years understudy 
among those years , from 2006 to 2008 it was second in priority, then from 2009 to 
2011 it became first priority. Out of 10 years, Kenya features only  three times, 2005, 
2009 and 2011. Both countries are not oil rich countries, even though recently Kenya 
discovered substantial amount of oil deposits. Kenya and Tanzania  enjoy stable 
political atmosphere with no incidents of civil war. Therefore, in this study Tanzania 
will represent the Priority African countries while Kenya represents non-priority 
African countries.  These two countries provide an interesting comparison in order to 
decipher Korean bilateral aid policy towards Africa. The significance of this study 
therefore will inform the motivation of the Korean bilateral aid policy towards Africa. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
Why is Korea increasing bilateral aid to Africa? 
Why is Tanzania a preferred destination for Korea bilateral aid than Kenya? 
While Korea has increased  its bilateral aid in Africa, it is of interest to find out 
whether ODA has been used as a tool to promote and protect its strategic interests or it 
has been used for the purposes of humanitarian goals. As the saying goes “ there is no 
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free lunch” in international relations, when ever one is offered free food there is a 
motivation behind it. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
Economic reasons is the main motivation for increase of Korean bilateral aid to Africa 
and Tanzania being a priority country. 
1.4 Scope of the study 
The study covers a period from 2005 to 2014, because this is when Korea changed its 
focus to increase bilateral aid to Africa, it is during this period that Seoul launched the 
‘Korea Initiative for Africa’s Development’, which established an elaborate 
mechanism for Korea’s engagement with the region and a subsequent foreign policy 
program. This study focus only on the Korea’s perspective as a donor and does not 
address the recipient perspective. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The first step this study  is to analyse the general overview relationship between Korea 
and Africa in terms of aid flow, trade (exports and imports), investment, diplomatic 
and humanitarian assistance. Scholarly materials written by individuals and institutions 
like  African Development Bank and OECD/DAC was analysed, trade statistics from 
UN Comtrade data base, investment statistics from World bank online website and 
general aid flow from KOICA annual reports. Simple graphs and charts was used to 
bring into focus the relationship.  
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Secondly, specific analysis of the relationship between Korea and Kenya was 
undertaken examining trade figures, aid flows, and investments, tables and charts was 
used. The  diplomatic and political engagement of the countries in question was also 
analysed. An indepth analysis was done on the sectors receiving aid and their patterns. 
 
Analysis of the relationship between Korea and Tanzania was undertaken examining 
trade figures, aid flow and invetsments, graphs and charts was  incorporated into this 
analysis. Following the summary of the analysis of the various aid recipient sectors, the 
patterns exhibited was looked at in-depthly. Finally, the results of the study was 
evaluated. 
1.6 Structure of the Paper 
The paper is  organised in six chapters.  Chapter one  discuss the role of aid and how 
Korea has increased her bilateral aid focus to Africa. The chapter also highlight  
historical relations between Korea and Africa, research question, hypothesis and 
rationale of the study. Chapter two reviews  the literature on aid, particularly the 
various motivations in aid allocation. Chapter three is theoretical framework of the 
study, Institutional rational choice theory is discussed, it also covers analytical 
framework of the study where Ricourian level of analysis is explained.. Chapter four  
looks in to detail the bilateral relationship between Korea and Kenya in regard to 
economic, political and social aspects. Chapter five deals with the bilateral relationship 
between Korea and Tanzania, here also the economic, political and social issues was 




There are many scholars who have written extensively about aid, of special interest is 
why governments give aid and what are the basis for individual donors to allocate their 
aid. Riddle (2008:91) argues that the major  purpose of donating aid is essentially to 
save lives during calamities, to contribute to economic progress and poverty 
eradication in disadvantaged countries. He acknowledges that this is partially true on 
why governments provides aid because official aid comes from public funds and is 
given to recipient governments, making it a political decision. But the question is what 
informs this political decision to allocate aid to one recipient and not the other? Riddel 
identifies six motives which historically have influenced donors; emergency needs, 
poverty eradication, commercial interests, political and strategic interests, solidarity 
and historical ties (ibid).  
 
According to Yoon and Moon (2014: 286), during Cold War strategic and ideological 
interests were the main determinants of aid allocation by donors. Western ODA 
disbursement was heavily influenced by whether the recipient country bordered 
communist state or was an ally of the Soviet Union ( Chan, 1992:6). With the 
disintegration of  Soviet Union, communism was no longer a key determining factor in 
ODA flows (Yoon and Moon, 2014). Post- Cold war era has seen shift of determinants 
of aid, economic interests such as trade, investment, energy, good governance and 
economic development being major motivation of donor countries. Fostering trade 
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relations is a motivation of some donors to advance aid to recipient countries, Younas 
(2008) found out that a significant assistance is given to recipients who imports heavy 
machinery and equipments from donor countries, considering that capital goods are 
produced by  developed donor nations, this result confirms their trade benefit motive 
(p.661). Other scholars (Nath and Sobhee, 2007, Dietrich,2012) also found strong 
relationship between trade and aid levels. 
 
There are some donors who are basing their aid giving decisions on human rights and 
democracy records of recipient countries. Finkel et al. (2007: 410) is of the view that in 
developing countries foreign aid may promote democracy in two ways, either through 
supporting and empowering domestic agents to achieve regime change or by altering 
structural conditions such as promotion of economic growth which leads to class 
transformation and hence implications for opening up of democratic space. 
 
Alesana and Dollar (2000) also concured that some donor countries give aid to 
developing countries undertaking greater democratization, in their study, other 
interesting findings included strategic interests and colonization factors played a 
greater role in allocation of aid. For example, Israel and Egypt received a large share of 
U.S. aid inspite the fact that they are not needy nations. Bilateral aid from France  
focused to countries she colonized.  Japan gives assistance to countries which align to 
her global political interests as exhibited by the correlation in voting patterns during 
the U.N. debates. Other recent studies found strong relationship between international 
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political factors particularly U.N. Security Council membership on aid recipient, 
countries that are elected to the U.N. Security Council the amount of aid allocated to 
them immediately increases during the year  that a country is elected to the Security 
Council.  The aid amount remain relatively high throughout the term of  two years, 
upon completion, the aid amount return to their previous level ( Kuziemko and Werker, 
2006: 907).  
 
The main objective of United States of America aid has  been to further her national 
interests, bilateral aid has been an essentail pillar of her foreign agenda  playing  a 
crucial role in advancing Americas geo-strategic intersts (USAID 2004: 3), peace and 
security is high in the agenda of America’s aid policy11. As a result massive amounts of 
foreign aid has been channelled to Amarica’s allies. This trend has been solidified after 
the terrorist attack of 11th September that the US Administration referred to as  war on 
terror (Riddel, 2008: 95). It has seen deployment of aid to countries perceived as key to 
US geopolitical interests. 
 
Japan provides aid in order to promote her own security and economic prosperity. This 
motive was clearly demonstrated by the then Foreign Affairs Minister who argued that 
Japan’s ODA is executed for Japan’s own sake (Riddel, 2008: 97). This statement 
                                                        
11Tarnoff. C and Lawson. M.L. (2016), Congressional Research Service,  “Foreign Aid: An 
Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy” no. 7-5700 updated on June 17,2016. 
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implies that self interest of  Japan is the first priority of her foreign aid policy.  This 
shade some light on why Japan’s foreign aid is highly focused in Asia. 
 
France, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain as well as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, colonial ties played a critical role in aid allocation, however, a recent 
study on aid allocation by major OECD/DAC donors found out that Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, aid was allocated specifically driven by poverty 
considerations (Jones et al. 2005: 13). It is possible for countries to abandon 
commercial and trade interests in allocation of aid for humanitarian purpose, as 
demonstrated by the United Kingdom when in 2002 enacted a legislation explicitly 
requiring ODA to be channeled solely for development and welfare to the poorest 
countries12. 
 
Bilateral ODA is more vulnerable to manipulation by donors for self interests in 
contrast to multilateral ODA which international organizations distribute to recipient 
countries (Easterly, 2006: 49).  Tuman and Ayub (2004:43)  posit that the African  
development has partly been financed by ODA resources, Korean aid is among the 
international aid Africa has received. However,  Korean bilateral aid to Africa is no 
exemption, it has followed the same pattern of other donors.  For example,  the Korean 
government initial objective of using ODA appears  primarily to have been  motivated 
by political and diplomatic factors to gain advantages over   North Korea. With the                                                         
12 International Development Act (2002), C. 1, S.1. 
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breakdown of Soviet Union and industrialization of Korea, Yoon and Moon (2014) 
posit that ODA has assumed a new role  to deepen Korea’s commercial bonds and 
investment opportunities  with developing countries. Watson concurs that Korea 
indeed  uses ODA as diplomatic policy tool to expand its economic gains (Watson, 
2011:60). Another study carried by Kim and Oh which examined the factors 
influencing Korean ODA, concluded that economic motives as exhibited by the levels 
of trade showed positive correlation with the amount of aid to recipient countries ( Kim 
and Oh, 2012: 233). Korea is emulating Japan’s mode of ODA to Africa, Tubman and 
Ayoub (2004:49) found also Japan allocate substantial amounts of aid to larger 
commercial partners. 
 
Kalinowski and Cho (2012:250)  holds the opinion that accessing oil resources in 
Africa is the main reason for gradual increase in Korean bilateral aid to Africa. 
According to the MOFA, Korea is 10th largest consumer and 8th importer of oil, it 
imports 90 per cent of her energy requirements13. Africa together with other regions 
like Central Asia and America are among regions that Korea has explored for oil 
resources due to the volatility of Middle East. Yoon and Moon(2014:287) asserts that 
if the first visit by Korean President Chun to Africa  in 1982 was to solicit support 
from African countries against  North-Korea and enhance diplomatic  visibility , then 
the second visit by  President Roh  to Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria which are oil-
producing  countries in 2006, was geared towards expanding  access to energy.                                                         
13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009. “Facts of Africa”, Seoul.p.25 
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China and India has also focused on Africa as a source of energy, market for their 
exports and destination for FDI, to this end their bilateral aid is aimed at accessing 
Africa’s market, investment opportunities and energy needs (Yoon and Moon, 2014). 
Another study by Carvalho and his collegues on aid flows to Africa from China, Japan 
and Korea found out that securing markets and natural resources is top on the agenda 
in determining allocation of aid than poverty reduction (Carvalho et al, 2012). Soyeun 
Kim (2013:53), also identifies three key motivations of Korea’s ODA to Africa 
including economic interests, political influence and development cooperation. Darracq 
and Neville (2014:5) observed that  energy security, need to expand to new export 
markets and the aspiration for political influence have made Korea to use foreign aid 
policy to achieve these ends. Mr. Park Kang-ho a senior official of Korean Foreign 
Ministry stated that Korea’s ODA is neither a gift nor a charity but a strategic 
partnership (Folley, 2011:84). 
 
It is evident from the literature that Korean aid to Africa is influenced more by 
strategic than humanitarian interests, however, the question remains what criteria does 
Korea use to allocate aid in Africa? According to Lee (2012:52), Korea’s aid allocation 
criteria is not clear, aid recipients are categorized into three groups, priority, ordinary 
or others. There was no clear-cut distinction on the aid allocation criteria among the 
groups listed. It is against this backdrop that it is important to carry out a comparative 




This research endeavours to find out why is Korea giving foreign aid to African 
countries? one of the theory to explain the Korea’s motivation is the Rational Choice 
Theory (RCT) in general and in particular Institutional Rational choice Theory (IRCT).  
Yoshimichi Sato argues that, “the purpose of rational choice theory is to explain social 
phenomena by assuming rational choice at the actor’s level… as well as actor’s 
action”(2013:1). RCT seeks to explain how individual actors make choices based on 
their preferences. Basic assumptions include; actors are basing their behaviour on 
rational calculations, actors act with rationality when making choices and their choices 
are geared towards optimizing their pleasure. Sato further argues that actors will 
choose an alternative that they believe achieves an outcome that maximises their utility 
under certain subjectively conceived constraints. In IRCT, institutions are the main 
rational actors making choices to maximize utility. Weigast and Wittman (2008:1032) 
defines institutions as humanly constructed constraints that regulates human 
interactions. Constraints range from official procedures, rules, regulations to written 
constitutions. 
The Korean bilateral aid system is framed in the form of institutions with specific 





3.1 Structure of Korean bilateral aid system 
Figure 4: Structure of Bilateral aid system of Korea 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 
 
As illustrated in figure 4 above, Korean bilateral aid has well developed structured 
system, at the top, there is the Committee for International Development Cooperation 
(CIDC) overseen by Office of the Prime Minister. CIDC is the main Official 
Development Assistance policy making organ, it is headed by the Prime Minister. The 
committee deliberates and decides the framework plans including priority countries to 
focus Korean bilateral aid. The Prime Minister’s office work closely with the Ministry 
of Foreign of  Affairs (MOFA) which is in charge of grant aid and Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance (MOSF) which oversees the concession loan aid. Korean bilateral aid 
system is a dual pillar system comprising of grants and loans. Grant aid is managed by 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) an agency under MOFA while loan 
Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) 













aid is managed by Economic Development Cooperation Fund (ECDF) an agency under 
MOSF. 
 
3.1.1 Institutional aid allocation procedure 
Korea’s midterm plan guides the size of aid allocation according to the number of 
recipient countries and total budgeted amount. Korean aid is broadly divided in to 
bilateral and multilateral aid, with the latter being Korean government contribution to 
UN and other international organizations,  and the former being allocation to eligible 
developing recipient countries. As noted earlier, the two implimenting agencies 
KOICA and ECDF, identify and select programs and projects for possible funding 
among many proposals submitted by developing countries. During this process 
consultations with parent Ministries is carried out (KOICA-MOFA and EDCF-MOSF), 
it is at this stage that country aid allocations are drafted. Also at this phase, Inter-
Agency Committee on Grants and the other Committee on Loan chaired by MOFA and 
MOSF respectively, deliberate and determine the projects for the following year to 
receive Korean aid. After the Inter-agency Committee, the country allocations are 
forwarded to CIDC for review and approval. Finally, the decision by CIDC is 
forwarded to the budgetary office of the National Assembly and Congress for approval. 
Korea has traditionally been providing  much of its aid to Asian countries but  Korea 
has increased its bilateral aid to Africa from 7.1% in 200514 to 21.7% in 201415. In 
                                                        
14 2006 KOICA Annual Report, P.18 
15 2014 KOICA Annual Report, P.12 
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addition, within Africa, some countries such as Tanzania are considered priority 
countries, receiving a larger per centage of the African share than others such as 
Kenya.   One may ask what explains this preference?  IRCT may provide an 
explanation on Korea’s choice of Africa and the priority countries within Africa. Korea 
as a rational actor aspires to achieve social outcome that maximum utility out of the 
bilateral aid, the social outcome may be  economic, political or social. For example,  in 
2006, when Ban Ki-Moon was campaigning for the  Secretary General of the UN 
position, Korea as a rational actor made a choice to increase bilateral aid to Africa to 
USD 100 million by 2008 (S.Kim and K. Gray, 2016:658), inorder to gain support 
from African countries.  In the same year (2006), Tanzania was a non-permanent 
member of UN Security Council received USD 3.745 million bilateral aid from Korea 
an increase from the previous year by 1.9%16. In 2012 when Korea was bidding to host 
the Green Climate Fund Secretariat, Seoul announced assistamce of USD 60 million to 
Africa with a view to secure African votes (ibid). In this study I argue that Korean 






                                                         
16 2006 KOICA Annual Report, P.24 
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3.2 Analytical Framework 
Figure 5: Ricoeurian circles 
 
Source: Ricoeur (2008:317) 
 
Ricoeurian three level of analysis was proposed by a French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur 
to help in analysing hermeneutics and social phenomena. In  this study the levels of 
analysis which is also known as Ricoeurian model is used to interogate the motivation 
of Korean bilateral aid to Africa. The motivations are categorised into three levels 
namely economic, political and social, each level of motivation is represented by one 
circle. As a general rule, the larger the size of the circle, the more important the 
motivation. For example, if the economic circle is larger followed by political circle 
and the social circle, it means that economic motivation is the main drive followed by 
political and less important is social motives. In the model also there are areas which 
intersect between two circles, for instance the intersection between economic and 





reasons. Then there is the area where all the three circles intersect, this area means that 
the motivation of bilateral aid is informed by social, political and economic reasons. In 
practice this area is every small, meaning that rarely donors provide aid for  social, 
political and economic reasons at the same time in equal measure. When donors 
provide bilateral aid to recipient country one of the three motivations is more 
pronounced than the other two, that is why the circles differ in size. 
 
As noted in the theoretical framework, that  Korean is a rational actor who makes 
rational decisions based on the utility, satisfaction or profit derived from making a 
choice. Korea will always strive to maximise its utility in dealing with other partner 
countries, foreign bilateral aid to African countries is no exception. As it is well known 
that Africa consists of fifty four (54) countries which are diverse in terms of 
geographical size, population, natural resource endowment and even level of economic 
growth. For example the largest African country by size is Algeria with an area size of 
2.38 million square kilometers and the smallest is Seychelles with an area of 459 
square kilometers. In terms of population, Nigeria is the largest with a population of 
154.7 million people and Seychelles is the smallest with a population of 92,000. In 
respect to natural resources , according to World Bank  “Africa is home to about 30% 
of the world’s mineral reserves, 10% of the world’s oil, and 8% of the world’s natural 
gas”17.  With regard to economic develeopment, Africa hosts 33 out of 48 world’s 
                                                        
17 World Bank accessed on http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview; 
17th October, 2016. 
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poorest nations18. In such a diverse continent what should be the criteria of extending 
bilateral aid? Should it be based on altruistic or self interest. In regards to this study the 
question is  why should Korea prefer to give more aid to Tanzania than Kenya?, what 
informs this decision?. The obvious answer is that Korea will prefer to give aid to a 
country that  will maximise its utility, this utility could be of economic nature, political 
or social. Since the main of objective of this study is to decipher bilateral aid to Africa, 
understanding the motivation behind is paramount and thus the Ricourian model 
becomes handy in helping to decipher. Therefore, Ricourian model will analyse Korea 
motivation on three levels,  economic motivation will be examined where trends on 
trade (exports and imports), foreign direct investment, ODA both in terms of grants 
and loans. The second level will be the political level, here diplomatic relations, high 
level exchange of visits and bilateral agreements will analysed, then lastly the social 
level where the level poverty, school enrollment, access to water will be looked to 
determine if there is any correlation with the amount of bilateral aid advanced to Kenya 
and Tanzania 
 
3.2.1 Economic Level 
At the economic level, the study explores the economic interests that a donor country 
could be motivated to pursue in the recipient country, some of the economic interests 
include access to market to expand its export base, search for raw materials, energy 
resources and investment opportunities.                                                         
18 2014 KOICA Annual Report:p.46 
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Korea’s economic growth averaged 3.6 per cent over the last decade, signifying a sharp 
drop compared to 9.3 per cent over the period between 1985 and 1995 ( Anyimadu and 
Neville. 2016:3).  Korea’s total bilateral trade with Africa is still very low, in 2015,  
Korea’s exports to Africa was merely 1.4 per cent. During the first quarter of 2016, 
Korea’s economic growth declined to 2.7 per cent resulting  to decline of  total exports. 
This trend increases the importance and urgecy of Korea to explore new markets for its 
exports. 
According to World Bank, Korea is the 15th world’s biggest economy, it depends 
heavily on  exporting her  industrial products. The desire to look for market for its 
products influences the foreign policy of the Korean government. One of the policy 
choice is the use of bilateral aid to expand its trade activities. To put it in another way, 
Korea may direct aid to those countries that have high potential to import Korean 
products than those which import less, therefore, one of the consideration to give 
bilateral aid is the opening up of the recipient domestic market to Korean products. 
 
In order to sustain its economic growth, Korea needs raw materials for its industrial 
production. Many African countries have abundant mineral resources and have become 
a target for  foreign aid. For example, China has used its ODA strategies to Africa to 
achieve its goals.  In 2006, during the FOCAC summit in Beijing, China announced a 
concessionary loans to Africa worth USD 5 billion. In 2009, china doubled the amount 
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to USD 10 billion19. As a result  China imports copper from Zambia, cobalt from DRC, 
iron ore from South Africa. Timber from Cameroon, Congo and Gabon (Kang et al, 
2010). China extends the largest share of its ODA to Africa in order to endear itself to 
the continent to access its resources. Is Korea also following the Chinese model in 
Africa?, Analysing Korea’s imports from Kenya and Tanzania may help to establish 
whether there is any link between imports, particularly natural resources and the 
amount of ODA advanced. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment may be another motivation for a donor country to advance 
foreign aid to a recipient country. For example Japan, its ODA Charter clearly 
stipulates that the main objective of its ODA is to “ensure Japan’s security and 
prosperity”20, therefore, it means that security and economic motives derive Japan’s 
ODA foreign policy than alleviating poverty. This is illustrated by Japan’s high level 
of tied aid in terms of loans. Many private companies in donor countries aspire to win 
major infrastucture tenders in developing countries. Businessmen pressure their 
governments to engage more developing countries. For example, when Korean 
President, Park Geun-hye visited three African countries (Ethiopia, Uganda and 
Kenya) in late May and early June, 2016, she was accompanied by a huge business 
delegation. The Korean entourage comprised of 169 delegates from 166 enterprises  
mostly from small and medium size enterprises specializing in machinery, consumer                                                         
19 Forum on China-African Cooperation, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/ accessed on 
20th October, 2016. 
20 Japan’s ODA Charter 
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goods and logistics21.  Economic Advisor, Ahn Jong-beom  argued  that  the three 
African countries visited  showed a remarkable economic growth of between 5 to 10 
per cent in 2016, irrespective of global economic slow down. The businessmen in the 
delegation were expected to explore potential  African market  access ”22. During the 
recent visit by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe to Kenya in August 2016, to 
attend the Six round of Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD 6), he was accompanied by a business delegation23. These examples potrays 
the bigger picture of how donor governments prioritise economic interests in dealing 
with recipient countries. Therefore, the Ricourian model will afford this study to 
interogate the economic motivation of Korean aid to Kenya and Tanzania. 
 
3.2.2 Political level 
Politics play an important role in country’s foreign policy, establishment of diplomatic 
relations is the first step in official recognition between two sovereign states. It is as a 
result of the diplomatic relations that nations cooperate at the bilateral and multileral 
level to address common challenges or seek support at the international level. 
 
 
                                                         
21  Korea. Net. http://m.korea.net/english/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=136553&page=1 
accessed on 20th October, 2016. 
22 ibid 
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/ke/page4e_000501.html 
accessed on 20th October, 2016. 
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3.2.2.i Bilateral level 
At the bilateral level when countries establish diplomatic relations, the second step is 
to strengthen this relationship by establishing diplomatic missions  in each others 
capital. It is generally regarded that those developing countries that have Embassies in 
donor countries capital have leverage in pushing their policies to the host country, 
including foreign aid. It is  interesting to find out how diplomatic presence affects 
foreign aid, because whereas Korea has diplomatic mission in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salam, it is only Kenya which has resident Mission in Seoul while Tanzania is 
represented by its Mission in Tokyo, Japan which is accredited to Seoul. In connection 
to this point, we are curious to find out how the relations with DPRK plays out in the 
foreign aid policy. Both Kenya and Tanzania have diplomatic relations with DPRK, 
however, Tanzania has close relations with DPRK due to ideological preference to 
socialism. Infact DPRK has resident mission in Dar es Salam, then the question is why 
is Korea not providing more bilateral aid to Kenya which has resident mission in Seoul 
and does not have resident mission of DPRK in Nairobi? 
 
Bilateral relations is deemed to be warm and cordial if there is frequent exchange of 
visits  at the highest level. These high level exchanges not only unlock opportunities 
for trade, investment, cultural exchange, ODA, exchange of information and 
knowledge but also send a strong signal to both countries on the level of friendship and 




Agreements signed between two countries signifies the level of commitment to 
cooperate in specific areas of mutual interest. For example, when countries negotiate 
and sign Free Trade Agreements (FTA), signifies the intention to promote trade 
between the two countries. When they sign a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) means 
they intend to promote foreign direct investment. Therefore, analysing the agreements 
signed helps to understand the political motivation towards bilateral aid. 
 
3.2.2.ii Multilateral level 
Political support at the UN has often been used by the donor countries to determine the 
level of foreign aid recipient countries attracts. For example, when the immidiete 
former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was campaigning for the position, Korea 
courted Africa and as a result Korea increased its Foreign aid to Africa three folds 
(Kim.2013:55). Another example where political support induce increase in foreign 
aid, is exhibited when Korea was bidding  to host the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
Secretariat in Songdo, Korea, it announced an assistance plan to Africa of USD 60 
million during KOAFEC meeting in return to African votes (Kim. 2013:66). 
When a developing country is a non-permanent member on UN Security Council also 
affect the amount of foreign it receives from donors during the period it serves at the 
Security Council. Hoeffler and Outram (2011)  argued that aid has strong correlation to 
U.N. votes between donor and recipient countries. 
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3.3 Social level 
As stated in the 2014 KOICA annual report and also the World Bank report of 2013 
that out of 48 poorest countries in the world, 33 countries are found in Africa. These 
are countries with a larger population below the poverty line with less opportunities to 
advance themselves out of the vicious cycle of poverty. The challenges facing poor 
countries are many ranging from extreme hunger,  high child and maternal mortality 
rates, low primary school enrollment rate, lack of accessible clean water and spread of 
communicable diseases such as Malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In 
acknowledging this dire situation the international community in the year 2000 
established the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) with an “aim to  reduce by half 
the number of people living in extreme poverty by the year 2015. The MGDs consisted 
of eight goals including eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal 
primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child 
mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for 
development”24. Donor countries were encourage to devote more resources to achieve 
the MDGs. Korea as a responsible member of the international community and an 
emerging donor who joined OECD/DAC in 2010 may have been inspired by the plight 
of the extreme poor people to extend bilateral aid to alleviate the social challenges 
affecting African countries. Therefore,  analysing the social factors and the target 
sectors of Korean ODA may help to find the motivation.                                                         
24 The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015: United Nations  
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 Chapter 4 
Case Study of Korean Bilateral Aid to Kenya 
 
Kenya has been one of the African countries receiving Korean aid since 1989, it has 
been consistent but volatile, examining the bilateral relations between Korea and 
Kenya may help us understand Korean aid in Africa. In this chapter, economic, trade 
and political relations is examined to find out if there are any pattern between Korean 
aid and economic, trade or political factors. 
 
4.1 Bilateral Economic Relations 
4.1.1 Bilateral Aid 
 
Table 2: Korean ODA to Kenya Net disbursement (USD Million) 
Year Amount in US $ 
Million 
% share in Total 
Korean ODA 
% share of Korean 
ODA in Africa 
2005 10.9 2.49 27.88 
2006 15.5 4.65 32.43 
2007 2.6 0.58 3.70 
2008 1.8 0.38 1.70 
2009 4.5 0.88 4.74 
2010 2.8 0.33 2.00 
2011 9.3 1.44 5.21 
2012 9.0 0.87 3.45 
2013 5.3 1.17 1.95 
2014 3.7 0.31 1.11 
Total 65.4   
 
Source: . OECD (2005-2014) 
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Table 2 above shows that for the period under review 2005 to 2014, Kenya received  
Korean aid amounting to USD 65.4 million. In 2006, Kenya received the highest 
bilateral aid from Korea amounting to US $15.5 and the lowest amount in 2008, US $ 
1.8 million. Korean aid to Kenya has generally been decreasing since 2006, this trend 
confirms the fact that Kenya is not a priority country in Korean ODA policy. 
The Percentage share of  Korean ODA to Kenya in respect to total Korean ODA also 
shows a downward trend with the highest share registered in 2006 of 4.6 per cent and 
the lowest in 2014 of 0.31 per cent. One observation is that the percentage share in 
total Korean ODA has generally remained below zero point since 2006, it is only in 
2011 and 2013 that the per centage share increased above a single digit. 
In the African continent, the per centage share exhibit a similar pattern of downward 
trend with the highest share recorded in 2006 of 32.43% and the lowest in 2014 of 
1.11%. Another interesting observation here is since 2006, the share has been a single 
digit in decreasing pattern. 
As we have noted earlier that ODA comprises two elements of loan and grants in the 
next figure we shall examine the loan part of ODA extended to Kenya. 
Table 3: Korean ODA Gross Loans to Kenya 














Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
Kenya received a total of US $ 35.6 million from 2005 to 2014. The highest amount 
was received in 2006 amounting to US $ 15.2 million and the lowest amount US $ 0.1 
million in 2014. For three consecutive years from 2007 to 2009 Kenya received zero 
amount. The general trend of Korean loan is downward. 
Table 4: Korean ODA Grants to Kenya 













Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
Korean ODA grants amounted to US $36.4 million for the period under review. The 
highest amount of grant was given in 2011 amounting to US $6.1 million while the 
lowest amount was in 2005 of US $0.5 million. The amount of grants increased 
gradually from 2005 to 2011, there after it has assumed a downward trend. Kenya 
received slightly more grants than loans. 
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4.1.2 Bilateral Trade in Goods 
Table 5: Korea imports and exports to Kenya as reported by Korea (USD Million) 
Year Amount in US $ Million 
Exports Imports 
2005 71.0 4.3 
2006 204.9 5.1 
2007 136.7 7.8 
2008 156.3 5.7 
2009 164.7 5.6 
2010 232.7 9.2 
2011 214.9 17.6 
2012 263.0 27.8 
2013 258.0 29.2 
2014 344.5 28.1 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2005-2014) 
Trade relations between Korea and Kenya has been increasing since 2005. Korean 
exports to Kenya increased from US $ 71 million in 2005 to US $344.5 million in 2014 
accounting for over 400% increase, while imports from Kenya also increased from US 
$4.3 million in 2005 to US $ 28.1 million in 2014 accounting for over 600% increase. 
The balance of trade is heavily skewed in favour of Korea. The main exports from 
Korea to Kenya include manufactured goods, chemicals, machinery , transport 
equipments and fuel. From 2005 to 2013, manufactured goods accounted for over 75% 
of exports, followed by chemicals and Machinery and transport equipments. In 2014, 
fuel accounted for over 50% of total exports, followed by manufactured goods at 30% 
and chemicals at 10%. Main imports from Kenya include food products, ores and 
metals. 
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4.1.3 Bilateral Investment in Kenya 
 
Table 6: Korea Foreign Direct investments in Kenya as reported by Korea (USD 
Million) 












Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
Korean FDI in Kenya is very low, the Kenyan economy has not been able to attract 
South Korean investors. Table 6 above shows that in four years there was zero Korean 
investment in Kenya (2007,2008,2010 and 2014). The highest FDI was recorded in 







4.2 Political Bilateral Relations 
4.2.1 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
Korea and Kenya established diplomatic relations in 7th February, 196425, since then 
the relations have been cordial and warm. Korea opened resident diplomatic Mission in 
Nairobi in 1964 the same year they establshed diplomatic relations, while Kenya 
opened a resident Embassy in Seoul in July 2007. Prior to July 2007, Kenya Embassy 
in Tokyo was accredited to Korea. 
 
4.2.2 High Level Visits 
4.2.2.i From Korea to Kenya 
Korea and Kenya exchanged high level visits majoriy being at Ministerial level. Some 
of the high level visits from Korea to Kenya include;  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ban 
Ki-Moon in January 2005 August and November 2006, Minister for Trade, Kim Hyun-
chong in March 2005 the Minister for Environment, Lee Chi-bum, 1st Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Shin Kak-Soo in January 2010, Former Prime Minister, Han Seung-
soo in June 2011, Minister of Special Affairs, Lee Jae-oh, in  July 2011, National 
Assembly Vice Speaker, Chung Ui-hwa, in January 2012.  
 
                                                        
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/countries/middleeast/countries/20070804/1_24494.jsp?menu=m_
30_50 accessed on 19/05/2016 
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Others who visited include Secretary General of the National Assembly, Yoon Won-
jung in March 2012, Prime Minister, Kim Hwang-sik in July 2012, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Kim Sung-hwan in January 2013, Vice Speaker of the National 
Assembly, Park Byung-suk in January 2013, National Assembly Member, Chung 
Byung-kuk in January 2013, Speaker of the national Assembly, Kang Chang-hee in 
July 2013 and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee Kyung-soo in July 2014.  
 
4.2.2.ii From Kenya to Korea 
 Minister of Roads, Public Works, and Housing, Raila Odinga in April 2005, Minister 
for Immigration, Jebii Kilimo in May 2005, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Raphael 
Tuju, in November 2006, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Richard Onyonka in 
November 2009, Vice President, Kalonzo Musyoka in 2010, Minister for Medical 
Services, Professor Any’ang Nyong’o in November 2011. 
Other visits include Minister for Trade, Moses Wetangula in June 2012, Minister for 
Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services, Naomi Shaban in July 2012, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Sam Ongeri in October 2012, Prime Minister, Raila Odinga in 
November 2012 , Speaker of the National Assembly, Justin Muturi in March 2014, 
Cabinet Secretary for Information, Communication and Technology, Fred Matiang’i. 
 
4.2.3 Diplomatic Relations with North Korea 
Kenya established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2012.  Kenya and North 
Korea  do not have resident missions in each others capital. Kenya’s Embassy in 
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Beijing, China is accredited to Pyongyang, while North Korea’s Embassy in Kampala 
is accredited to Nairobi.  
 
4.2.4 Bilateral Agreements signed  
During the period under the study Kenya and Korea signed three (3) Agreements 
including  Agreement on Promotion and protection of investment, Agreement on 
avoidance of double taxation and Agreement on grant aid all these were signed in July 
2014 in Nairobi. 
 
4.3 Social relations 
The Millennium Development Goals Status Report for Kenya in 2013 shows  the 
proportion of people living below the poverty line was 45.9 per cent in 2005  and in 
2012 was 34.2 per cent 26. Net Enrolment Ratio in Primary Education was 82.8 per cent 
in 2005  and in 2013 was 95.9 per cent27. Under five-mortality  rate was 92 per cent in 
2005  and in 2011 was  74.0 per cent , infant mortality rate was 60 per cent and in 2011 




                                                        
26 Ministry of Devolution and Planning, “Millennium Development Goals Status Report for 
Kenya 2013”. P.5 
27 Ibid. p. 8 
28 Ibid. p.18-19 
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4.3.1 Sample of social Projects financed by Korea bilateral aid 
Korea has financed a number of projects in Kenya in line with the Millenium 
Development Goals, some of the projects include Development and Rehabilitation of 
Ground water wells in Kitui, Turkana and Garrisa, Construction of a water purification 
plant in Asembo and Water Supply facilities in Suswa, Construction and Remodelling 
of 18 Primary Schools in Nairobi, Nakuru and Thika, Improvement of Kitengela 
Clinic, Drinking Water Development in Tana Basin. 
 
4.3.1.i  Development and Rehabilitation of Ground Water Wells in Kitui, Turkana 
and Garissa. 
Access of clean water is a major challenge in Kenyan rural areas, particularly in the 
Arid and Semi-Arid areas of Kitui, Turkana and Garissa. According to United Nations 
International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations classifies 
Kenya as chronically water scarce country, it argues that ‘water supply estimates show 
that only 56 per cent of Kenyan population have access to safe water. Approximately 
80 per cent of hospital attendance is due to preventable diseases and about 50 per cent 
of these illnesses are water, sanaitation and hygiene related’ . In 2004, Kenya 
experienced a worst drought adding to misery to the population, in 2006, KOICA 
intervened to alleviate the situation by financing various water projects. One of the 
bilateral aid project is the development and rehabilitation of ground water well in Kitui, 
Turkana and Garissa, this project invoved development and rehabilitation of water 
wells, provision of equipments, dispatch of experts and the rehabilitation of groung 
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water wells through supporting Non-gevermental Organizations (NGO). The project 
costed USD 400,000. The project period was 2006.  
 
4.3.1.ii Construction of Water Purification plant in Asembo and Water Supply in 
Suswa 
Another water project financed by KOICA is the construction of water purification 
plant in Asembo and water supply facilities in Suswa, the project involved construction 
of a large-scale purification plant in Asembo with a processing capacity of 166 cubic 
meters per hour. In Suswa, KOICA repaired an existing 166 cubic meter volume 
reservoir and rehabilitated two ground water wells and a 7 kilometer long pipeline. The 
project costed USD 2,420,000, it was implemented between 2007 and 2008. 
 
4.3.1.iii Drinking Water Development in Tana Basin 
 Tana River is the main source of drinking water for residents in Northeaster region of 
Kenya. However, the water is safe and clean for drinking. In 2008 and 2009, KOICA 
undertook a project for drinking water development in Tana Basin, the project entailed 
“development of ground water wells and installation of facilities for the usage, the 
construction of pipes, the provision of equipment for water analysis and vehicles for 
research, the dispatch of experts in ground water, Civil engineers and mechanics and 
the invitation of trainees to Korea for training (on Groundwater, water inspection, 
purification facilities, and management)” (Kim Jin-Oh et al, 2010:817). KOICA 
invested USD 2,080,000 for the project. 
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4.3.1.iv Construction and Remodeling of 18 Primary Schools in Nairobi, Nakuru 
and Thika. 
In 2003, Kenya implemented free primary school education which saw increase in 
enrollment, the number of students increased from 5.9 million to 8 million. This rapid 
increase was not marched with the corresponding increase in infrastructure. KOICA in 
a bid to assist the Kenyan governement, funded USD 2.5 million (ibid,816)  to expand 
and remodel 15 existing schools and construct three new schools, the project also 
involved the dispatch of experts for project management, training of teachers in Korea 
and supply of learning equipments. 
 
4.3.1.v Improvement of Kitengela Clinic 
The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Kenya requested assistance in improving 
marternal health clinic so as to reduce rampant cases of marternal and child mortality 
during delivery. KOICA in 2008 and 2009 funded the expansion and equiping of the 
maternal clinic in Kitengela. The project involved “ construction of clinic buildings, 
the provision of ambulances, an x-ray machine, ultrasound machine and delivery beds 
and invitation of the officials of the Ministry of Health to Korea for training” 
(Kim Jin-Oh et al, 2010:815). 
Conclusion 
The bilateral relations bewteen Kenya and Korea is largely motivated by economic 
factors, trade is high on the agenda. The political motive reinforce the economic 
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agenda. This is shown by the increase in trade volume with the opening of  Mission in 
Seoul. The Kenyan foreign policy emphasise on economic diplomacy, Korea is one of 
the country that Kenya benchmark itself with. Further, the exchange of visits 
culminated in signing of the two important agreements on protection and promotion of 
investment and avoidance of double taxation. The lack of legal framework on 
investment is responsible for the low flow of Korean FDI to Kenya. 
On Korean perspective, Kenya is an important economic player in East Africa region, 
therefore courting  it through grant aid is  a sure way to keep it close and to penetrate 
the market. Korea Trade –Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) established an 
office in Kenya to promote trade and investment in Kenya. Therefore the bilateral aid 













Case Study of Korea Bilateral Aid to Tanzania 
 
5.1 Bilateral Economic Relations 
5.1.1 Bilateral Aid 
Tanzania like Kenya, has been receiving Korean ODA since 1998. Korean aid has been 
consistent and on upward trajectory since 2005. Analysing the bilateral relations 
between Korea and Tanzania may help us understand  Korean aid in Africa. In this 
chapter, economic, trade and political relations is examined to find out if there are any 
pattern between Korean aid and economic, political or social factors. 
 
Table 7: Korean ODA to Tanzania Net disbursement (USD Million) 
Year Amount in US $ 
Million 
% share in Total 
Korean ODA 
% share of Korean 
ODA in Africa 
2005 2.4 0.55 6.14 
2006 3.8 1.14 7.95 
2007 9.4 2.11 13.39 
2008 7.2 1.53 6.91 
2009 9.2 1.80 9.68 
2010 21.5 2.57 15.37 
2011 20.9 2.34 11.72 
2012 50.6 4.88 19.39 
2013 56.9 12.58 20.94 
2014 79.8 6.67 23.99 
Total 261.7   
 
Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
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Table 7 above shows that for the period under review 2005 to 2014, Tanzania received  
Korean ODA amounting to US $ 261.7 million. Korean bilateral aid to Tanzania has 
increased rapidly from US $ 2.4 million in 2005 to US $ 79.8 in 2014, registering 
3,325 per cent increase in 10 years. The growth rate demonstrate the importance of 
Tanzania in Korean aid policy, and hence the consistency of Tanzania being a priority 
country for the last 9 years until 2013. However, even in 2014 when Tanzania was 
droped from the priority list, it received even the highest amount during the period. 
  
The Percentage share of  Korean ODA to Tanzania in respect to total Korean ODA 
also shows an upward trend with the highest share registered in 2013 of 12.58 per cent 
and the lowest in 2005 of 0.55 per cent. One observation is that the per centage share in 
total Korean ODA has generally remained single digit since 2006, it only increased to 
double digit in 2013  then it went back to single digit in 2014 of 6.67 per cent. 
In the African continent, the per centage share exhibit a similar pattern of increasing 
trend with the highest share recorded in 2014 of 23.99 per cent and the lowest in 2005 
of 6.14 per cent. Another interesting observation,  in 2014 Tanzania received 23.99 per 
cent share of total Korean bilateral aid to Africa and yet it was not among the priority 
countries. 
In order to understand in detail the composition of Korean aid to Tanzania, we next 




Table 8: Korean ODA Gross Loans to Tanzania 












Source: OECD(2005-2014)  
Tanzania received a total of US $ 177.2 million from 2005 to 2014. The highest 
amount was received in 2014 amounting to US $ 66.9 million and the lowest amount 
US $ 0.6 million in 2009. For two consecutive years from 2005 and 2006 Tanzania 
received zero amount. Tanzania received more loans than grants and the general trend 
of Korean loans is increasing. 
Table 9: Korean ODA Grants to Tanzania 













Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
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Korean ODA grants amounted to US $84.7 million for the period under review. The 
highest amount of grant was given in 2012 amounting to US $ 13.2 million while the 
lowest amount was in 2005 of US $2.4 million. The amount of grants increased 
gradually from 2005 to 2012, it slightly dropped in 2013 but it increased in 2014. The 
amount of grants is mostly used to finance social infrastucture projects such as health, 
education, agriculture and water and sanitation. 
 
5.1.2 Bilateral Trade Relations 
Table 10: Korea imports and exports to Tanzania as reported by Korea (USD 
Million) 
Year Amount in US $ Million 
Exports Imports 
2005 30.6 1.7 
2006 42.1 8.0 
2007 67.9 2.9 
2008 77.5 1.0 
2009 67.8 10.8 
2010 107.3 70.5 
2011 91.1 45.1 
2012 199.6 23.3 
2013 145.0 46.1 
2014 333.0 42.5 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2005-2014) 
 
Trade relations between Korea and Tanzania has been increasing since 2005. Korean 
exports to Tanzania increased from US $ 30.6 million in 2005 to US $333.0 million in 
2014 accounting for over 1,000 per cent increase, while imports from Tanzania also 
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increased from US $1.7 million in 2005 to US $ 42.5 million in 2014 accounting for 
over 2,500 per cent increase. The balance of trade is heavily skewed in favour of 
Korea. The main exports from Korea to Tanzania include manuctured goods such as 
plastic and rubber, chemicals, machinery and transport equipments. Manufactured 
goods accounted for over two thirds of totals exports from 2005 to 2013, however, in 
2014 the trend changed fuel accounted for more than of half of exports. While main 
imports from Tanzania included ores and metals and Food products. 
Table 11: Korean Foreign Direct Investment in Tanzania as reprted by Korea 












Source: OECD (2005-2014) 
Korean FDI in Tanzania is generaly very low, the higest flow of FDI was USD 1.6 
million in 2007. In the year 2011 and 2013 there was no investment made. The low 





5.2 Political Relations 
5.2.1 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
Korea and Tanzania established diplomatic relations in 30th April, 199229, since then 
the relations have been cordial and warm. Korea opened resident diplomatic Mission in 
Dar es Salam in 1992 the same year they establshed diplomatic relations. Tanzania 
does not have resident diplomatic Mission in Seoul, Tanzania Embassy in Tokyo is 
accredited to Korea. 
 
5.2.2 High Level Visits 
5.2.2.i From Korea to Tanzania 
Korea and Tanzania   exchanged high level visits,  majoriy being at Ministerial level.  
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea  the following 
are some of the high level visits from Korea to Tanzania  include; the then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Ban Ki-Moon in January 2005, Special Envoy of the President, Kwon 
Jin-ho in December 2005, Deputy Prime Minister, Park Young-joon in May 2010, 
Minister of Culture and Tourism, Chung Byeong-kuk in June 2011, Vice Speaker of 
the National Assembly Park Byeong-seok in January 2013, Speaker of the National 
Assembly Kang Chang-hee in July 2013, President of Committee of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade An Hong-joon in July 2014. 
                                                        
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/countries/middleeast/countries/20070804/1_24494.jsp?menu=m_




5.2.2.ii From Tanzania to Korea 
The highest visit from Tanzania to Korea was the Presidential visit by President Jakaya 
Mrisho Kikwete in November 2006. Other visits include Vice President, Mohamed 
Shein in May 2005, Minister of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, Juma 
Ngasongwa in April 2006, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
Bernard Membe in May 2007, Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Prof. David 
Mwakyusa in October 2007, Minister of Energy and Minerals, William Ngeleja, 
Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism, Shamsa Mwangunga in October 2008, 
Minister for Planning and Finance, Mustafa Mkullo, November 2008 and 2011. 
Also visited include Prime Minister Bernard Membe, in August 2009 and July 2011, 
Minister for Industry, Trade and Marketing, Abdalla Kigoda in August 2012, Minister 
of Energy and Minerals, Sospeter Muhongo in October 2013 and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and International Co-operation Bernard Membe in December 2013.  
  
5.2.3 Diplomatic Relations with North Korea 
Tanzania established diplomatic relations with North Korea  since its independence in 
1960s.   North Korea  have resident missions in Dar es Salam, while Tanzania does not 
have a resident mission in Pyongyng.   
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5.2.4 Bilateral Agreements signed 
Tanzania and Korea signed a number of bilateral agreements including loan agreement 
in Construction of Malagarasi Bridge and access roads signed in 2007, Agreement on 
the Improvement of Water supply system in Dodoma town signed in 2009, Agreement 
on the construction of Muhimbili University Hospital signed in 2009, Agreement on 
Iringa-Shinyanga Backbone Investment Project signed in 2011, Agreement on medical 
equipment supply to Muhimbili University Hospital signed in 2010, and Agreement on 
construction of Zanzibar Irrigation Infrastructure Project signed in 2011. 
 
5.3 Social relations 
According to the United Republic of Tanzania Millennium Development Goals Report 
Mid-way Evaluation 2000-2008 for Tanzania the proportion of people living below the 
poverty line was 33.64 per cent in 2008. Net Enrolment Ratio in Primary Education 
was  97.2 per cent in 2008. Under five-mortality rate rate was 112 per 1,000 live births 
in 2008, infant mortality rate cent  was 68 per 1,000 live births in 2008.Maternal 
mortality was 578 deaths per 100,000 live births in 200830. 
 
5.3.1 Sample of social Projects financed by Korea bilateral aid 
During the period 2005 and 2014 Korea financed a number of projects in Tanzania 
through bilateral arrangements, some of the projects include Development of ground 
                                                        
30 United  Republic of Tanzania, Millennium Development Goals Report: Mid-way Evaluation 
2000-2008. P.iii 
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water in Dodoma and Shinyanga regions, Rehabiltation of the irrigation facilities and 
modernization of the farms, Establishment of the Agro-Processing Training-cum- 
Production centers, capacity building for diagnostic service improvent of health centers 
in Dar er Salam and Effective ICT education at the college of engineering and 
technology, University of Dar es Salam. 
5.3.1.i Development of ground water in Dodoma and Shinyanga regions. 
Like Kenya, Tanzania also experienced severe drought in 2004, even though Tanzania 
has abundant water sources, lack of management of water resources facilities 
exercebated the situation. For example, girls are forced to walk for several hours in 
search of water . In order to address the situation Tanzanian Government came up with 
“Integrated Water Resources Management and Development Program (2002-2005) and 
the “National Development Plan (2006-2025)”. KOICA funded the development of 
ground water project in Dodoma and Shinyanga regions to the tune of USD 1.5 million 
from 2006 to 2008. The project involved construction of eight new wells, 
refurbishment of existing water facilities and installed 40 rainwater harvesting 
facilities. 
 
5.3.1.ii Rehabilitation of the Irrigation facilties and modernization of farms in 
Zanzibar and Morogoro 
 The Tanzanian government requested Korea for support in modernizing its 
agricultural industry by implementing irrigation schemes. In 2007 to 2009, KOICA 
invested USD 1.7 million in rehabilitation of the irrigation facilities and modernization 
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of the farms. The project involved “ rehabilitation of the underground water 
development and irrigation facilities, the provision of equipment, the support for 
Agricultural mechanization, dispatchof experts and invitation of related persons for 
training in Korea.  
5.3.1.iii Establishment of the Agro-Processing Training-cum-Production centers  
Tanzania is endowed with abundant agricultural produce, however, a larger percentage 
of the produce goes to waste, particularly fruits due to lack of processing facilities. In 
2007, only 4 per cent  of 2.7 million tons of agricultural produce were processed, 
compared to the Phillipines 83 per cent, Malaysia 78 per cent and Thailand 4-50 per 
cent.  The Tanzanian National Development Plan prioritised Agro-processing industry. 
KOICA decided to fund contruction of training centers for processing agricultural 
produce in Zanzibar, Morogoro and Dar es Salam. The project also involved the 
provision of equipments, dispatch of experts and training of Tanzanians in Korea. The 
project was implemented from 2008 to 2010 at it costed USD 3 million. 
 
5.3.1.iv Capacity building for diagonistic service improvement of health centers in 
Dar Es Salam 
During the visit of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete 
in Korea in 2006, he requested the Korean government to improve medical diagnostic 
capabilities in Da es Salam, Tanzania. In response to the request, KOICA undertook a 
project to construct diagosis centers for contagious diseases and maternal and child 
care in three  health centers in Dar es Salam namely Rangitatoo, Buguruni and Sinza, 
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provided equipments for diaginizing infectious diseases such as tuberclosis, AIDS, 
hepatitis, and liver diseases. It also dispathced Korean experts to Tanzania as well as 
training Tanzanian doctors in Korea. The projected costed USD 4.5 million and was 
implemented from 2008 to 2010 (Kim Jin-Oh et al, 2010: 442). 
 
5.3.1.v Effective ICT education at the College of Engineering and Technology, 
University of Dar es Salam 
University of Dar es Salam (UD) is one of the primier  institutions of higher learning in 
Tanzania, majority of bureaucrats are UD alumni including the current President John 
Magufuli, hence, it plays a pivotal role in the development of the country. One of the 
challenge facing UD was the lack of ICT facilities and enough man power. KOICA 
dedcided to finance the renovation of the two ICT centers, provided equipments and 
dispatched experts from Korea as well as training Tanzanian lectures in Korea. The 
project costed USD 2 million and it was implemented from 2006 to 2008. 
Conclusion 
The bilateral relations shows that economic factors reign supreme in making Tanzaia a 
priority country. Loan aid has increased dramatically and so are the trade volumes. 
Tanzania has focused on financing her socioeconomic projects through consessional 
loans, this has endeared it to Korea. Tanzania also has vast mineral resources, recently 
it dicovered huge deposits of  natural gas, attracting Korea even more. Even though 
there are few high level visits from Korea to Tanzania and lack of resident mission in 
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Seoul, this political factors have not stopped Korea from prioritising Tanzania, this 
leads to a logical conclusion that economic factors is the driving force.  
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Chapter 6 
Summary of Key Findings and Conclusion 
 
The summary of findings is organized in line with the levels of analysis starting with 
economic, political then social motivation. 
6.1 Economic Motivation 
6.1.1 Bilateral aid 
The data has shows that Korea provides more bilateral aid to Tanzania than Kenya, the 
gap between the two countries started to widen from  2011. The difference in the 
amount of  grant aid given to Kenya and Tanzania has not been significant, even 
though Tanzania received slighlty higher amount. However, the difference in the 
amount of loan is significantly high, implying that Tanzania receives more loan aid 
than Kenya. For example, in 2014, Tanzania received USD 12.9 million in grant aid 
while Kenya received USD 4 million, accounting for USD 8.9 million difference. In 
the same year Tanzania received USD 66.9 million in Loan while Kenya received USD 
0.1 million accounting for USD 66.8 million discrepancy as illustrated by figure 6 
below. What is remarkable in figure 6, is that from 2011 to 2014 the  amount of loan 
aid advanced to Tanzania has been increasing annually. It is the amount of loan that 
makes Tanzania a priority than Kenya in respect to Korean bilateral aid. Grant aid 
finances social infrastructure while loan aid finances economic infrastructure. Loan is 
more inclined to economic motivation to both Korea and Tanzania. I argue that loan 
has economic benefit to Korea, for example, the loan Agreement on Iringa-Shinyanga 
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Backbone Investment Project amounting to USD 36.4 million signed in 2011 between 
Korea and Tanzania.  
Figure 6: Net ODA loans and grants disbursed to Kenya and Tanzania in USD 
million 
 
Source: OECD (2016) 
The objective of the project was to increase power supply on the national grid to 
Tanzania’s northern region through construction of  transmission lines and expansion 
of related four substations in Iringa, Dodoma, Singida and Shinyanga. Since it was 
financed by Korea, on one hand, implementation of the project is usually done by 
Korean company, that means consultancy, procurement, construction and training is 
executed by Korean companies, in other words loan has the effect of creating overseas 
business for Korean companies. On the other hand, implementation of the project has 
the effect of stimulating economic growth through provision of reliable electricity to a 
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6.1.2 Bilateral Trade (Exports) 
Korea exports more goods to Kenya than to Tanzania, however, the gap has been 
narrowing. For example, in 2012 Korea exported goods worth USD 263 million to 
Kenya and USD 199.6 Milion to Tanzania, resulting a difference of USD 63.4 million. 
In 2014, Korea exports to Kenya was USD 344.5 million and to Tanzania USD 333 
Million, narrowing the difference to USD 11.5 million as shown in figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: Korea’s exorports of goods to Kenya and Tanzania in USD million 
 
Source:UN Comtrade (2005-2014) 
It should be noted that in 2011 Korea increased loan aid to Tanzania, the trade figures 
show that exports to Korea increased in 2012, reduced slightly in 2013 and increased 
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6.1.3 Bilateral Trade (imports) 
Korea imports more goods from Tanzania than Kenya, from 2005 to 2009, imports 
from both Kenya and Tanzania was negligible below USD 10 million per year. 
However, from 2010 to 2014 imports increased significantly from both countries, 
registering over USD 40 million for Tanzania and over USD 20 million for Kenya per 
year. In 2014, Korea imported more food products and metals in both countries. Figure 
8 illustrate the import trends. Coincidentally showing a tremendous increase in imports 
in 2010 onwards. 
Figure 8: Korea’s imports of goods from Kenya and Tanzania in USD million 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2005-2014) 
Where as Korea has been exporting more goods to Kenya, it has been importing more 
from Tanzania than Kenya. Korea extend aid to countries that trade with her, this 
relationship is also exhibited by other countries that receive Korean aid. For example, 
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2014. In  Ethiopia Korean exports increased from USD 50.4 million in 2010 to 154.7 
million in 2014. In Ghana, Korean exports increased from USD 212.7 million in 2010 
to 351 million in 2013 and Senegal, exports from Korea increased from USD 44.4 
million 2010 to 127 million in 2014, all these show significant increase in trade. On the 
other hand those countries that have less trade relations with Korea, receive less aid. 
For example, Mauritania, Korea exports in 2010 was USD 7 million, it  received USD 
0.1 million  total aid from Korea. In 2010 Korea exported goods worth USD 10.3 
million to Malawi and the corresponding bilateral aid was USD 0.4 million. Therefore, 
this emphasise  that trade influence Korean aid policy. 
 
6.1.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
Korean FDI to both Kenya and Tanzania is very low. Korean investors have not been 
attracted to both countries. Even though Tanzania has been a priority country in 
Korea’s foreign policy, the business community have not shown willingness to invest. 
Therefore, there is no link between foreign aid and FDI.  
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6.2 Political Motivation 
6.2.1 Diplomatic relations 
Korea has diplomatic relations with both Kenya and Tanzania. It has resident 
diplomatic mission in both countries. Kenya opened a resident diplomatic mission in 
Seoul in 2007, while Tanzania does not have resident diplomatic presence in Seoul. 
Opening of a resident mission in each others capital signifies very close relations 
between two countries. Those countries with resident missions have an upper hand in 
lobbying for favourable foreign policy towards their sending countries. In this case, 
Kenya ought to have more influence with Korean government by virtue of her presence 
in Seoul, including soliciting for bilateral aid. However, Tanzania is the priority in 
regards to Korean bilateral aid inspite of not having a resident mission. Another 
finding is that even though North Korea has diplomatic relations with both Tanzania 
and Kenya, it has a resident mission in Dar es Salam. Making Tanzania priority 
country is meant to alleniate influence of North Korea in Tanzania. 
 
6.2.2 High level exchange of visits 
Korea has exchanged high level visits with both Kenya and Tanzania. Korea has made 
seven(7) visits at Ministerial and Senior officials level to Tanzania between 2005 and 
2014. Tanzania inturn  has made fourteen(14) visits to Korea, including Presidential 
visit in 2006, when the immediate former President Jakaya Kikwete visited Korea in 
November 2006. At the same period, Korea made fifteen(15)  visits to Kenya, while 
Kenya reciprocated with twelve (12) visits to Korea, the highest being that of former 
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Prime Minister, Raila Odinga in November 2012. There was more exchange of high 
level visits between Korea and Kenya than Korea and Tanzania.  The implication is 
that, it is not the frequency of the visit but the level of the visit which matters 
politically. After the visit of President Kikwete of Tanzania to Korea, total aid 
increased annually. The President visit added political impetus. 
 
6.2.3 Bilateral Agreements  
Tanzania signed six bilateral loan Agreements while Kenya signed one grant aid 
Agreement and two investment protection Agreements. The agreements signed with 
Kenya are yet to enter into force since they have to go through the process of 
ratification. While the Agreements signed with Tanzania are already in force. The 
direction of the agreements signed by both countries points towards enhancing 
economic relations  with Korea. 
 
6.3 Social Motivation 
Both Kenya and Tanzania have high level of people living below the poverty line, by 
2008 the per centage of the population below the poverty line in Tanzania was 33.64 
per cent while in 2009 in Kenya was 45.2 per cent. This means that Kenya had more 
poor people requiring aid than Tanzania. Primary school enrollment was higher in 
Tanzania than in Kenya at 97.2 and 95.9 per cent respectively. In infant and maternal 
mortality rate Kenya was doing better than Tanzania. Access of safe drinking water in 
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Kenya was in the rural areas 44 per cent and urban 71.1 per cent, while in Tanzania 
access in rural areas was 57.1 per cent and 83 per cent in urban areas. 
Comparatively Kenya on one hand showed high indices of poverty than Tanzania in 
poverty ratio, primary school enrollement and access to safe drinking water, on the 
other hand, Tanzania showed high levels of health problems in infant and maternal 
mortality. Based on the data, considering social issues was the driving motivation in 
bilateral aid delivery, Kenya would have qualified to receive more aid than Tanzania. 




In this study we explored the criteria of determining the Korean bilateral aid to Africa 
by deciphering comparative trends from case studies of Kenya and Tanzania over a 
period of ten years. We found that even though social and political factors may have 
contributed to aid increase in Tanzania, economic factors are the main motivation. 
Loan aid has consistenly increased over the period financing socio-economic 
infrastructure. This therefore, implies that Korean aid policy is driven by economic 
motives. A major lesson here for African countries to appreciate the Korean bilateral 
aid motives, so that they could allign their policies to take advantage of the positive 
gesture shown by Korea to strengthen existing and explore new opportunities. As it has 
been shown in the study that grant aid alone is not sustainable because of limited 
amount, it needs to be complemented by concessional loans to finance socio-economic 
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infrastructure which will act as a catalyst for development. Tanzania has shown that it 
is possible to spur socio-economic growth through targeted strategic use of Korean aid 
, this experience provides vital lesson worth emulating by other African countries. 
 
Implication of the study to Kenya 
Kenya needs to refocus  her relations with Korea to reap maximum benefit by targeting 
concessional loans to finance its development projects as espoused in the Kenya’s  
economic development plan, Vision 2030. In this development plan there are a number 
of infrastructure projects such as the Lamu Port South-Sudan Ethiopia Transport 
project, which could not only benefit from concession loan financing but also 
technology and expertise from Korea.  
 
Korea strives to diversify its energy sources, Kenya discovered  a significant amount of 
oil but does not have the finance and technology. In this regard,  Kenya  could benefit 
from active engagement of Korea in the oil industry, especially through concessional 
loan financing and technology transfer. 
 
Implications for African countries 
Africa’s economic growth provides an excellent opportunity for closer business 
engagement with Korea. However,  it is essential  for strategic reorientation of the 
bilateral relationship existing to maximize their potential in the following areas; 
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 Many African countries have enormous potential in natural resources. Korean 
investors will continue to be attracted by these natural resources, Africa stands 
to benefit from  engagement with Korea in the mining industry in respect to 
financing and transfer of technology. 
 Infrastructure development in Africa is still a major challenge. Korea has 
managed to  modernize her infrastructure due to its strenghts in civil 
engineering. Africa could partner with Korea to addrress such challenges 
within the framework of bilateral aid. 
 Africa needs to move up the value chain in the global market to achieve 
sustainable growth.This requires investment in manufacturing sector which 
have huge potential for creating employment opportunities. Korea has robust 
manufacturing industries which are expanding to other Asian countries like 
Vietnam and Cambodia in search of cheap labour. Some African countries may 
provide better location for manufacturing. 
 Korea has vast experience and capabilities in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), Africa  may benefit not only by harnessing ICT industry in 
the continent but also  knowledge sharing porgramme undertaken by Korea. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 Kenya is in the process of establishing Special Economic Zones to spur 
industrialization in the country and also to create  Job opportunies for the 
youth. Korea ODA could be a valuable to the country in attracting Korea’s 
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small and medium size industries to set up their manufacturing base in Kenya 
to take advantange of not only Kenyan market but also the wider East African 
Community market. 
 Industrialization would require vibrant and skilled man power, Korea is strong 
in vocational training. Within the framework of bilateral aid, Kenya may 
benefit the setting up and equiping of vocational training facilities to train 
skilled man power for various fields. 
 Kenya has adopted a devolved government where decisions have moved from 
the central government to county government. County government can decide 
their development priorities and finance them through budgetary allocation 
from the central government. This therefore implies that county government 
are the major players to develop their respective jurisdictions. The Samael 
Undong training could be introduced to the county goverments, within the 
framework of bilateral ODA to enhance economic growth at the rural areas. 
 Water conservation and storage is key for industrialization and rural 
development. Even though Kenya receives adequate amount of rainfall 
annually, a lot of water goes to waste. Korea has knowledge and capabilities to 
construct multipurpose dams with high water storage capacity. Kenya may 





Contribution to  academia  
Many studies conducted on Korea aid to Africa have focused on the whole continent as 
a unit of their study. The contribution of this study to the academia is the carrying out 
of  comparative study between Kenya and Tanzania in respect to Korean bilateral aid, 
it has added knowledge to the academia on Korea’s aid activities in Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
Limitation of the study 
The study has mainly focused on the Korean perspective, that is the data used is mainly 
as reported by Korea, this may not present a balanced view. It would have been more 
valuable if perspective from both Kenya and Tanzania would have been included to 
determine the motivation of Korea aid. 
 
This study has given us an opportunity to learn on how  Korea aid is positevely 
impacting on the lives of rural population in Kenya  and Tanzania through aid projects. 
The financing of water, education and health projects,  even though they are small in 
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